Security Advisories Latest four
There's no new VMSA today, so these are the four most recently released or updated advisories; Broadcom's advisory portal has the rest. VMSA-2026-0008.1 still lists "Patch pending" for every SDDC Manager version, and vCenter CVE-2026-59310 in VMSA-2026-0006 remains the most important fix if you haven't applied it. Away from the advisories, Recorded Future has documented GhostFrame, an ESXi implant that needs root on the host to install, so no VMware CVE is involved (Cyber Security News [Press]). For the Linux kernel TCP flaw CVE-2026-98432, Broadcom's KB 461242 covers Tanzu Platform stemcells and appliances and Bitnami images but says nothing about VCF, vSphere or ESX, and there's still no Broadcom statement on the OpenSSH "SSHole" flaw CVE-2026-123158.
Node.js, as used in SDDC Manager, has a Brotli decoder out-of-bounds write that an attacker with network access to SDDC Manager could use to run code. It is critical (9.8) on SDDC Manager 9.1.1 and important (7.5) on 9.0.x, 9.1.0 and 5.2.x; revision .1 on 28 Oct clarified the impacted products in the response matrix. Every fixed version in the matrix is still "Patch pending", and the only SDDC Manager 9.1.1 patch on TechDocs, 9.1.1.0200, doesn't mention it. Broadcom's portfolio statement KB 460791 says SDDC Manager in VCF 9.1.1 is the only critically affected product. Press reports say CISA added the underlying Brotli flaw to its KEV catalogue on 27 Oct with a federal deadline of 10 Nov, which has now passed; the Broadcom advisory itself makes no statement on exploitation. Issue date 27 Oct 2026.
- CVE-2026-111497 9.8 SDDC Manager Node.js Brotli · 9.8 on 9.1.1, 7.5 elsewhere · reported KEV 27 Oct
DoApply KB 460732 on 9.1.1 or KB 460734 on 5.2.x, 9.0.x and 9.1.0, keep SDDC Manager reachable only from trusted admin hosts, and subscribe to the advisory so you see the patch the day it lands.
For desktop hypervisors: Workstation 25H2 and 26H1 and Fusion 25H2 and 26H1, CVSSv3 8.1 to 9.3. Both CVEs need local admin rights inside a guest and can lead to code execution on the host. There are no workarounds and the advisory makes no statement on exploitation.
- CVE-2026-59346 9.3 VMXNET3 integer overflow
- CVE-2026-59347 8.1 HGFS stack overflow
DoUpdate Workstation and Fusion to 26H1u1, especially if you run nested labs on a laptop.
Still the one to prioritise. It covers vCenter, ESX, Workstation and Fusion (and so VCF, VVF and Telco Cloud), CVSSv3 2.7 to 9.8, with no workarounds. CISA added vCenter CVE-2026-59310 to its KEV catalogue on 18 Aug 2026 with known ransomware use. Security Affairs [Press] reports CISA added the ESX logging flaw CVE-2026-41709 on 28 Oct with a federal deadline of 11 Nov, which is today; it has its own fixed builds in the matrix. The Broadcom advisory itself makes no statement on exploitation. First published 29 Jul 2026; revision .2 on 19 Aug added 7.0 patch guidance for the critical issues.
- CVE-2026-59309 9.8 vCenter VMDir auth bypass
- CVE-2026-59310 9.8 vCenter Syslog traversal · KEV
- CVE-2026-47876 9.3 ESX VMXNET3
- CVE-2026-41703 7.6 ESX OOB read
- CVE-2026-41709 2.7 ESX logging · reported KEV 28 Oct
DoPatch vCenter to 9.1.0.0300, 9.0.2.0100 or 8.0 U3k / U2f (VCF 5.x: async patch to 8.0 U3k per KB 88287). On ESX 9.0, ESXi-9.0.2.0100-25595025 covers all three ESX CVEs. On 9.1 the matrix lists ESXi-9.1.0.0200-25557999 for CVE-2026-47876 and ESXi-9.1.0.0-25370933 for the other two. On 8.0, ESXi80U3k-25595708 fixes CVE-2026-47876, U3i-25205845 CVE-2026-41703 and U3j-25429389 CVE-2026-41709; ESXi80U2f-25626445 covers only CVE-2026-47876. For VCF 5.x the matrix lists 5.2.4 for CVE-2026-41709.
If you run Avi Load Balancer (including for VKS or VCF Automation), this one matters. Seven CVEs, CVSSv3 7.1 to 9.8, no workarounds; the worst, CVE-2026-47865, is an authentication bypass on the Avi control plane. The advisory makes no statement on exploitation. First published 14 Jul 2026; revision .1 on 7 Aug added the 22.1.7-2p12 patch.
- CVE-2026-47865 9.8 control-plane auth bypass
- CVE-2026-47871 8.8 directory traversal
- CVE-2026-47867 8.7 RCE
- CVE-2026-47869 8.7 authenticated RCE
- CVE-2026-47866 8.3 authorisation bypass
- CVE-2026-47868 7.8 local privilege escalation
- CVE-2026-47870 7.1 privilege escalation
DoUpgrade 32.1.1 to 32.1.2 or later (the advisory's recommended version), 31.1.1–31.2.2 to 31.2.2-2p3, and 30.1.1–30.2.6 to 30.2.7. On 22.1.x, 22.1.7-2p12 fixes CVE-2026-47865, but the matrix lists 30.2.7 for the other six.
All VMware security advisories on Broadcom's support portal →
Deep Dive of the Day Making execInstalledOnly stick on ESX: Secure Boot, the TPM and the scripts it won't stop
GhostFrame and the GlobalProtect-to-vCenter intrusions from October have one habit in common: once they have root, they switch off execInstalledOnly. That setting is the reason an ESX host refuses to run a binary that didn't arrive inside a signed VIB, which is exactly what ransomware and implants need to do. Broadcom's secure ESX configuration docs describe the boot option as guaranteeing "that the VMkernel executes only binaries that have been properly packaged and signed as part of a VIB". The question for your hosts isn't whether it's on today, but whether an attacker can turn it off.
There are really two switches. Since ESXi 8.0 there's a runtime setting that's on by default and can be turned off with a single command, plus the older boot-time kernel setting. Anders Olsson at Truesec argues for the boot-time option, because changing it only takes effect after a reboot, which gives you time to notice. He also lists the events worth alerting on in vobd.log: vob.uw.exec.installonly.violation when something is blocked, vob.uw.exec.installonly.disabled when the setting is switched off, and vob.uw.exec.installonly.warning when something runs because it's off. If you already forward ESX logs to a remote collector, those are cheap alerts to add.
The step that makes it stick is enforcement through the TPM. On a host with TPM 2.0, ESX seals its configuration to the TPM, and the docs explain that the sealing policy can enforce the execInstalledOnly boot option, with Secure Boot enforcement as a prerequisite. Truesec describes the result: if the setting has been turned off, the host deliberately stops at boot with a purple screen rather than carrying on unprotected. KB 373898 gives the order: TPM 2.0 and UEFI Secure Boot in firmware, execInstalledOnly set with esxcli system settings kernel set and a reboot, both "Configured" and "Runtime" showing TRUE, then enforcement with esxcli system settings encryption set, checked with esxcli system settings encryption get.
Two things to plan for before you roll this out. First, the docs say that once you've activated the TPM you can't undo it, and recovery depends on the recovery key, which vCenter nags you to back up; get that key into your password vault before a motherboard swap or TPM failure turns into an outage. Second, enforcement means any third-party VIB or agent that relies on running unpackaged files will stop working, so test vendor drivers, backup agents and monitoring tools on one host first. Truesec also notes that VMware once withdrew its advice to enable the setting because it broke Update Manager baselines, which is a good reminder to check with your lifecycle tooling.
Be clear about what it doesn't do. KB 373898 states plainly that, up to and including ESXi 8.x, execInstalledOnly doesn't stop scripts run through an interpreter such as the Python that ships with the host, and that ESXi 7.0 has no built-in way to block them; Truesec notes that some ransomware has been written in Python for exactly that reason. So it raises the bar rather than closing the door. The real controls are still keeping root away from attackers: management networks only reachable from admin hosts, no shared or AD-group admin roles on hosts, patched vCenter and ESX, and alerts on root logins and on changes under /etc/rc.local.d.
In a nested lab, most of the TPM side won't apply unless your nested hosts have a TPM; the docs note that a host without one protects its configuration with a key derivation function instead of sealing it. You can still practise turning on the boot-time setting and watching the vobd events, but leave enforcement testing to a physical host you're happy to rebuild.
Based on Securing the ESX Configuration (vSphere 9.0) Official KB 373898: execInstalledOnly Not Preventing Script Execution on ESXi Official ESXi 8.0 and execInstalledOnly: the good, the bad and the ugly (Truesec)